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JUDGE GALBRAITH'S CHARGE.
"While the whole world seems adverse to desert," reputation
is too dear a thing to be purchased at little cost. It comes slowly
to the deserving, but it comes surely, and remains forever. In the
profession of the law, as in that of the gospel, he who has put his
hand to the plow and looks back, is unworthy of his calling. The
harvest is reaped by other hands.
"Still to be strenuous for the bright reward,
And in the soul admit of no decay,
Brook no continuance of weak-mindedness-
Great is the glory, for the strife is hard !"
JUDGE GALBRAITH'S CHARGE.
Clarion County, Pennsylvania.
In order to find a true bill against one charged with adultery, the grand jury mustbe
satisfied that he was a married man at the time of the commission of the offence,
and that the woman with whom the act was proved to have been committed, was
the wife of another man living at the time. Per GALBRA TH, P. J.
The following Charge was read to the Grand Jury by GALBRAITH,
P. J.
In the list of offences furnished by the district attorney, that will
probably come before the grand jury, for their deliberation, is that
of adultery.
It is somewhat remarkable that this offence is not distinctly de-
fined in Pennsylvania, either by legislative enactment or decision of
the Supreme Court. Our acts of assembly of 1705 and 1791, pre-
scribe a punishment for the crime by name, but there is nothing to
define what shall constitute the offence itself, and we are not aware
that the point has ever come directly before the Supreme Court.
There is some division and a good deal of confusion not only in the
popular, but in the professional mind, upon the subject. We must
therefore meet it, and determine it for ourselves with the best lights
we have, on principle, and on authority elsewhere. The word itself
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comes from the same root as "adulterate," which is defined in our
dictionaries, in substance, to corrupt, to debase by foreign admix-
ture, and "adultery," is defined, in substance, in most of our lexi-
cons to be a "1 violation of the marriage bed of another person." By
the Mosaic law, it is very clear, that in order to constitute adultery,
the illicit sexual intercourse must be with a married woman. In the
20th chapter of Exodus, we have the decalogue, as announced from
Mount Sinai, the 7th commandment of which prohibits adultery. In
the 22d chapter and 16th and 17th verses, which is a continuation of
the same authority, it is prescribed, that "if a man" (without distin-
guishing whether married or unmarried,) ", entice a maid that is not
betrothed," &c., then prescribing a punishment. This latter injunc-
tion would have been unnecessary if it was adultery, because that
was already prohibited in the 14th verse of the 20th chapter, the 7th
commandment. The laws are repeated again in Deuteronomy; and
when we read from the 13th to the 29th verses inclusive, of the
22d chapter, we perceive very clearly the distinction in a criminal
point of view, between an unlawful sexual intercourse with a mar-
ried woman or betrothed, (regarded as the same) and an unmarried
woman. The same distinction will be found in the laws of most
countries, either barbarous or civilized. It is rather amusing to
read the irregular and ingenious inventions of cruelty contrived to
punish the crime against the rights of a husband in the laws of some
of the old and barbarous countries. By the Roman law, a man was
entirely justified in taking the life of the adulterer caught in the
act of violating his marriage bed, and by the laws of England, he is
so far justified, that his crime of taking life under those circum-
stances is reduced to manslaughter, which does not follow from the
taking of life for the same act against any other relation than that
of the husband. It is settled as the law of Connecticut, as defined by
Swift, in his system of the laws of Connecticut, that adultery is "the
carnal connection of a man with another's wife. The man may be
either married or single, but the woman must be married, for the
essence of the crime is the adulteration of the offspring, the spuri-
ousness of the issue. If a married man has carnal knowledge of a
single woman, it is not adultery, but fornication."
JUDGE GALBRAITH'S CHARGE.
The present Chief Justice Lewis, in his excellent treatise on the
"Criminal Law of the United States," from which this quotation from
Swift is taken, says "it is believed that this is also the law of Ver-
mont," and quotes State vs. Way, 6 Verm. R., 311, and refers also
to the case of State vs. Wallace, 9 New Hampshire, 518, for the
same principle in that State. Our own Supreme court in the case
of Respublica vs. Roberts, 1 Yeates, 6, and 2 Dall., 124, have de-
cided that the intercourse of an unmarried man with a married wo-
man is not adultery in the man. That the decision in this case
stands, not upon legal principles, but upon mere usage, is most clearly
and satisfactorily shown in the treatise of Chief Justice Lewis above
referred to, at page 41, and must have been decided upon the prin-
ciples of the strictest construction of the criminal law so as to ex-
tend it to no case not clearly brought within it. We must take the
law, then, as settled, that in order to constitute the crime of adultery,
the man must be married, violate his own marriage vow or contract
with his own wife. This is in mitigation of what I conceive to be
the true legal principle governing the definition of that crime, as
the judges themselves intimate. If left on principle alone, I
would say that was adultery in both man and woman. It is cer-
tainly much more clear ihat in order to constitute that crime, the
woman should be married. The main element of the offence, is the
admixture, the corruption, that "which introduces or may introduce
into a family, a spurious offspring." This cannot be done other-
wise than with a married woman. The case of .Duncan vs. Common-
wealth, 4 Ser. & Rawle, 449, at first blush would seem to militate
against this principle. That was a case of adultery and bastardy.
The point now under consideration was not raised, and we have no
history of the facts, and when we consider there are circumstances
under which a married woman may be the mother of a bastard, the
case ceases to be an authority to overturn a clear legal principle,
and to extend the criminal law to cases not within its distinct pro-
visions, to charge and convict one of a crime nowhere defined and
nowhere decided to be that particular offence, against the true mean-
ing of the word itself, and which the legislature have not thought
proper to extend beyond its legitimate literal meaning. The eccle-
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siastical courts in England having jurisdiction of all acts of this de-
scription, we can obtain but little light from the common law, ex-
cepting by analogy-cases of crim. con. furnish some light. They
are frequently found by husbands against persons violating their
rights in this particular, but no cases are found in favor of wives.
The reasoning of our own Supreme Court in the cases of Matchin
vs. Matchin and Hollister vs. Bollister, in 6 Barr, although in both
cases somewhat foreign to the point we are at, are in accordance
with the views we have taken, and serve to some extent to fortify
what we have said. I am aware, that both in scripture and in com-
mon language, the term adultery is used as a general expression of
any of the classes of incontinence or want of chastity, and is also, it
may be said, of perjury, forgery and other terms, without regard to
legal provision or of all the requisite elements necessary to consti-
tute the offence. The marriage of a man having connection with a
single woman may be well said to be an aggravation. It undoubt-
edly is so; he violates his own marriage vow, which a strict casuist
might regard as a perjury in a moral case, and so it may be; and so
with other offences, there may be circumstances of aggravation at-
tending the commission of an offence of a lower grade by legal de-
nomination, rendering it more aggravated in a moral sense than one
of a higher grade in the criminal code. A larceny may be com-
mitted under circumstances which would make it a higher offence in
a moral point of view, than a robbery under other circumstances.
But it is not aggravation that is to determine legal definition and
description of crime, all the essential requisites, the necessary ele-
ments to constitute the crime in a legal sense must be shown.
Without extending reasons further, then, we say that a charge of
adultery against a man, first, on the authority of Bespublica against
.Robert8, the Commonwealth must satisfy the jury, that he was a
married man at the time of the commission of the offence, and in the
second place, on legal principles, as well as the true meaning of
the term itselft and respectable authority elsewhere, the jury must
be satisfied also of the marriage of the woman with whom the act
was committed; in other words, the man must be a married man and
the woman with whom the act is proved to have been committed, a
